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I.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past seventy-five years, most humanitarian interventions have led to the removal of central governments and other authority structures, which in turn has destabilized individual countries
as well as regions of the world. Although humanitarian intervention
is still needed in today’s world, the international community must
determine the most likely outcome of abruptly removing central
governments and other authority structures before taking unilateral
or collective military action under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, even when taking such action is to protect populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
Idealistically, humanitarian interventions end atrocities and establish peace and prosperity; realistically, however, humanitarian
interventions are extraordinary actions by States that are inherently
destabilizing regardless of the intervenor’s altruistic intent. The
doctrine of humanitarian intervention seeks to prevent humanitarian
tragedies.1 Yet, perhaps a State that intervenes in another’s internal
affairs cannot simultaneously safeguard citizens facing genocide
and avoid engaging in active military conflict. Thus, military action
under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is not merely a humanitarian cause but rather a highly explosive affair that can cripple
a country’s infrastructure and have global ramifications. For instance, the military operations portrayed as a humanitarian intervention in Libya caused economic, cultural, and political destabilization

1

Arman Sarvarian, Humanitarian Intervention After Syria, 36 LEGAL STUD.
20, 22 (2016).
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in a country that, before the intervention, ranked among the most
productive GDP countries in Africa.2
The legality and ethical legitimacy of past humanitarian interventions by States have been evaluated under various analytical
frameworks by jurists, such as Ved P. Nanda, whose research the
authors expanded upon in earlier articles examining the legitimacy
under customary international law of the humanitarian interventions
in Libya3 and Kosovo.4 The consequences of the multi-state NATOled military intervention in Libya in 2011, and the American-led intervention in the Syrian Civil War in 2014, strongly militate in favor
of the argument that the Potential for Destabilization (P4D) should
be the threshold criterion that States must satisfy before engaging in
any further deliberations about unilateral or collective military action under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity. This is especially so when the ultimate result of
an intervention may be the removal of the central government and
other authority structures.
Reexamining the criteria by which States establish a case for humanitarian intervention under customary international law is appropriate now, a time when the possibility of military intervention in
Latin American countries has simmered in newsfeeds for the past
year.5 Talks between the U.S. and other Latin American countries
2

Cruz A. Echevarría & Javier García-Enríquez, The Economic Consequences of the Libyan Spring: A Synthetic Control Analysis, 30 DEF. & PEACE
ECON. 592, 593 (2019).
3
See generally Richard A.C. Alton & Jason Reed Struble, The Constitutionality and Advancement of International Humanitarian Ideals in Libya by NATO
and United States’ Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector, 23 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L 1, 9 (2014).
4
See generally Jason Reed Struble & Richard A.C. Alton, The Legacy of
Operation Allied Force: A Reflection on its Legality Under United States and International Law, 20 MICH ST. INT’L L. REV. 293, 300 (2013).
5
See generally Carrie Kahn & Alex Leff, Trump’s Venezuela Moves Follow
Long History of Intervention in Latin America, NPR (February 22, 2019, 1:35
PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/22/696057482/trumps-venezuela-moves-follow-long-history-of-intervention-in-latin-america; Patrick Leet, Washington
Doubles Down on its Military Intervention Script in Venezuela, NACLA (May
31, 2019), https://nacla.org/news/2019/06/01/washington-doubles-down-its-military-intervention-script-venezuela; Frank O. Mora, What a Military Intervention
in Venezuela Would Look Like, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (March 19, 2019),

28

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:25

have been conducted.6 And, after a failed coup, the Venezuelan opposition leader, Juan Guaidó, intimated a desire for U.S. military
intervention.7 Furthermore, former National Security Advisor John
Bolton made hints at military intervention against not only Venezuela, but also Cuba and Nicaragua.8 In light of the current political
and humanitarian crises in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela giving
rise to calls for action by the international community, it is time to
revisit the criteria by which States establish a case for humanitarian
intervention under customary international law.
In making a case for P4D to be the threshold criterion that States
must satisfy before engaging in any further deliberations about unilateral or collective military action in the name of humanitarian intervention to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity, the works of international
law jurists, historians, scholars on international relations, moral ethicists, and operational professionals are surveyed. Part II traces the
development of P4D born out of the authors’ prior research on past
humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and Libya. Part III briefly explores definitions of customary international law and humanitarian
intervention. Part IV surveys theories from the fields of economics,
ethics, and change management, specifically the moral hazard, just
war, and the transition model, to further develop P4D. Part V examines alternatives of P4D, such as the treaty-based criteria the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Responsibility while Protecting
(RWP). Part VI concludes that P4D ought to be the first consideration by States before taking unilateral or collective military action
in the name of humanitarian intervention. In Part VII, P4D is

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-03-19/what-military-intervention-venezuela-would-look.
6
Andres Oppenheimer, A U.S. military intervention in Venezuela is not completely unthinkable anymore amid Trump’s rhetoric, MIAMI HERALD (May 3,
2019, 5:06 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columnsblogs/andres-oppenheimer/article229989249.html.
7
Venezuela crisis: Guaidó ‘considering asking US for military intervention’, BBC (May 5, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america48172520.
8
Matt Withers, John Bolton and the Monroe Doctrine, THE ECONOMIST
(May 9, 2019), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/05/11/john-bolton-andthe-monroe-doctrine.
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applied to potential interventions in Latin America to study P4D’s
utility in the current international climate.
II.

BRIEF REVIEW OF THE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN
KOSOVO AND LIBYA
To lay the foundation for the authors’ contentions that follow, it
is necessary to explore the authors’ prior examination of past humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and Libya. The authors’ examinations entailed the application of qualifying criteria developed by
international jurist Ved P. Nanda. Nanda’s criteria stood out to the
authors not only for its international recognition but also for its usefulness. The authors’ prior examination of the lead-up to each of the
military interventions in the former Yugoslavia and in Libya, which
were ostensibly taken to avert deepening humanitarian crises, gave
birth to P4D. As such, exploring the authors’ retrospective conclusions about the military interventions in Kosovo and Libya is key
for the establishment of P4D. A review of Nanda’s criteria is first
looked upon as applied to Kosovo. This is then followed by the
authors adding to Nanda’s criteria in their examination of the intervention that occurred in Libya.
A.

Kosovo
NATO’s Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was based on a
claim of humanitarian intervention;9 as such, it had altruistic aims to
prevent the suffering of innocent civilians. The authors employed
five criteria developed by Ved P. Nanda—(1) necessity, (2) proportionality, (3) purpose, (4) nature of the actors, and (5) maximization
of the best outcomes10—to examine the legitimacy under customary

9

Struble & Alton, supra note 4, at 313-25.
Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia and
Haiti—Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International
Law—Part I, 20 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 305, 330 (1992) [hereinafter Nanda
Part I]; Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia—Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International
Law—Part II, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 827, 827-28 (1998) [hereinafter
Nanda Part II]; see also Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International
Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N.
Charter, 4 CAL W. INT’L L.J. 203, 1974, at 258-67 (employing a three-prong
10
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international law of the humanitarian intervention by NATO in Kosovo. Nanda’s five criteria were applied retrospectively because
they provided a balanced analytical framework to examine whether
such a humanitarian intervention was warranted in the first place.
The authors posited that if a majority of the five criteria were satisfied, then (arguably) NATO’s bombing of Kosovo was legally justified under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The authors
determined that NATO’s operation in Kosovo could not be legally
justified under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.11
This determination that the intervention was not legally justifiable was based upon the failure of key elements of Nanda’s five criteria. The NATO operation in Kosovo was unnecessary because
there were no widespread incidents of gross, persistent, and systematic violations of basic human rights in Kosovo before NATO’s operation and bombing campaign.12 Before March of 1999, the month
that the ethnic Albanian delegation signed the peace plan but the
Serbian representatives rejected it,13 “the numbers of Kosovo-Albanians killed, raped or expelled up to this point were low
”14 After rejecting the peace plan, Serbian military and police forces
ramped up the intensity of their operations against ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo.15 Furthermore, the aggression used by NATO was disproportionate. The absence of casualties among NATO forces but

analysis of the substantive, procedural and preferential criteria of humanitarian
intervention under customary international law).
11
Struble & Alton, supra note 4, at 325.
12
Id. at 318 (citing AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. ET AL.,
POLITICAL KILLINGS IN KOSOVA/KOSOVO, MARCH-JUNE 1999: A COOPERATIVE
REPORT BY THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE SCIENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM
OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE 11 (2000));
NATO Strikes Over Kosovo Continue to Divide, 10 Years On, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4121076,00.html.
13
STEVEN WOEHREL & JULIE KIM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31053, KOSOVO
AND U.S. POLICY 3 (2006).
14
MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 101 (2005).
15
NATO and Kosovo: Historical Overview, NATO, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).
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the killing of innocent Kosovars seriously undermined any altruistic
justification for military intervention.16
The NATO operation failed to meet its purpose, which was purportedly set between U.S. national security interests and humanitarian concerns.17 In May of 1998, the North Atlantic Council set forth
NATO’s two main objectives for the conflict in Kosovo: (1) to help
to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis by contributing to the
response of the international community; and (2) to promote stability and security in neighboring countries with particular emphasis
on Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 18 In
June of 1998, President Clinton issued an Executive Order that declared a “national emergency” to deal with the threat of regional destabilization posed by the conflict in Kosovo19 and NATO began to
consider military options.20 NATO’s core objectives of the airstrikes that followed were “[t]o prevent more human suffering, more
repression, more violence against the civilian population of Kosovo.”21 In September of 1998, the United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council adopted Resolution 1199,22 which called for a cease-fire
and expressed deep concern about the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army.23
NATO’s Operation Allied Force in Kosovo failed the nature of
the actors’ criterion. Despite NATO being comprised of several nations, NATO was the sole actor. NATO lacked a mandate from the
U.N. Security Council, diminishing the need to address whether it
was “collective or unilateral.”24
16

Struble & Alton, supra note 4, at 320 (citing Richard A. Falk, Kosovo,
World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 847, 856
(1999)).
17
Id. at 321.
18
NATO, supra note 15.
19
Exec. Order No. 13,088, 63 Fed. Reg. 32109 (June 9, 1998).
20
See generally id.
21
Ved P. Nanda, NATO’s Armed Intervention in Kosovo and International
Law, 10 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 1, 8 (2000) (citing Press Release, NATO, Press
Statement – by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, (Mar. 23, 1999)).
22
S.C. Res. 1199 (Sept. 23, 1998).
23
Id.
24
Nanda Part II, supra note 10, at 827; See also Fonteyne, supra note 10, at
266-67 (stating that “collective operations should be preferred over individual
measures. While it is true that intervention does not gain in legality by being collective rather than individual, there is nevertheless a presumption that collective
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Lastly, the NATO operation failed to maximize the best outcome
because it effectively precluded any joint proceedings in attempts at
negotiating a settlement between Kosovo and Serbia, therefore leaving the only option as a unilateral declaration of independence by
Kosovo.25
B.

Libya
After NATO’s Operation Allied Force, the authors continued to
examine other humanitarian interventions, such as the two NATO
and U.S.-backed military actions in Libya named Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector. As with Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, NATO’s Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector were couched in terms of humanitarian intervention. Operation Odyssey Dawn aimed to end the humanitarian
crisis and stop the killing of civilians.26
In examining the legitimacy of NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Libya, the authors again applied Nanda’s five criteria while
developing an additional criterion to address the destabilizing nature
of humanitarian interventions.27 Thus, the criteria used were: (1)
necessity, (2) proportionality, (3) purpose, (4) nature of the actors,
(5) maximization of the best outcomes, and (6) P4D.28 As with Kosovo, the authors concluded that the military action could not be justified under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention because
Nanda’s five criteria in addition to the P4D criterion were not satisfied.
Briefly, as to each criterion, and delving into necessity first, it
became unclear whether NATO and the U.S., as sanctioned by the
U.N., were intervening in a civil war or genocide, thus calling into
question the necessity of the joint operations.29 Concerning purpose, as the NATO airstrikes progressed it became clear that their
aim was targeting Gaddafi and his fellow authority figures,30 which
called into question the Operations’ ostensible purpose of protecting
action is more likely to ensure the relative purity of the intentions required from
the intervenors.”).
25
Struble & Alton, supra note 4, at 325.
26
Alton & Struble, supra note 3, at 25-26.
27
Id. at 21.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 22-23.
30
Id.
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civilians from violence. Moreover, if the goal of airstrikes were to
protect civilians, then the targeting of authority structures would
raise questions about the proportionality and purpose of the joint
Operations.31 Regarding the nature of the actors, there was a collective response with the U.N. noting calls from the United Arab
League.32 However, questions soon began to circulate about whether
NATO was simply serving as the military arm for the U.N. Security
Council, in contravention of NATO’s role.33 The joint operations
failed to maximize the best outcome. NATO coalition forces
launched Operation Odyssey Dawn on March 19, 2011.34 By 2014,
the date of the authors’ Libya publication, it was evident that Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector each failed to
maximize the best outcome.35 That determination remains true today.
U.S. and NATO operations quickly ended after the death of Gaddafi.36 With the strongman Gaddafi gone and elimination of virtually all other authority structures, a civil war erupted in Libya,37 or
it quickly expanded at the very least if prior assessments concluding
that the country was already embroiled in a civil war are taken at
face value. After the fall of the regime, there was an uptick in violence directed at international parties in the region, such as the U.S.,
United Kingdom, and Italian diplomats, and members of the Red
Cross.38 There also was an outflux of weapons and fighters from
Libya to neighboring countries, such as Mali, Niger, and Syria,39 as
well as a brewing refugee crisis in Libya.40 Libyan officials
31

Id. at 23-26.
See generally S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
33
Alton & Struble, supra note 3, at 27.
34
Jeremiah Gertler, Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (Mar. 30, 2011),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41725.pdf.
35
Alton and Struble, supra note 3, at 27-33.
36
UN Security Council votes to end Libya operations, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27,
2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15481143.
37
Jonathan M. Winer, Origins of the Libyan Conflict and Options for its Resolution, MIDDLE EAST INST., (Feb. 2019), https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/201903/Origins_of_the_Libyan_Conflict_and_Options_for_its_Resolution.PDF (policy paper 2019-4).
38
Id. at 28.
39
Id. at 28-32.
40
Id. at 32-3.
32
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confirmed the movement of weapons into Syria.41 And Taureg militias, which had been fighting for Gaddafi, returned to Mali to fight
for control of their home country.42 Malian President, Amadou Toumani Touré, was unable to deal effectively with this onslaught of
fighters returning home and was ousted by the military that he had
controlled.43 Removing President Touré destabilized an otherwise
generally healthy administration, which up to that point had a budding relationship with the U.S.
Towards the end of 2018, the U.N.-backed GNA was forced to
call a state of emergency in the capital.44 The LNA leader, General
Khalifa Haftar, portrayed his struggle as necessary to end the mayhem caused by warring militias45 as he advanced on the capital, calling for further U.S. intervention.46 Human Rights Watch best summarized the situation:
Unaccountable militias—some linked to the interior
and defense ministries of the United Nations-backed
Government of National Accord (GNA), and others
linked to the Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated
with the rival Interim Government—continued to
clash with each other in various parts of the country,
41

Id. at 31-2 (citing C.J. Chivers, Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, In Turnabout, Syria Rebels Get Libyan Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/world/africa/in-a-turnabout-syria-rebelsget-libyan-weapons.html?pagewanted=all).
42
Id. at 31.
43
Id.
44
Civil War in Libya, Council on Foreign Relations (May 29, 2019),
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya.
45
David D. Kirkpatrick, Libyan Forces Fighting for the Capital Disavow Extremists,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
13,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/13/world/africa/libya-tripoli-khalifa-hifter.html (“A former
officer in Muammar el-Qaddafi’s army, General Haftar broke with the dictator in
the 1980s and received C.I.A. support before fleeing to Virginia, where he lived
for two decades. He returned to Libya shortly before the NATO intervention in
2011 hoping to lead the revolution against Colonel Qaddafi. Sidelined by the rebels, he re-emerged in 2014, waging a battle against Islamists in the eastern city
of Benghazi. After years of fighting, he gained control over eastern Libya. Then
he set his sights on Tripoli.”); Frederic Wehrey and Jeffrey Feltman, Libya Is Entering Another Civil War. America Can Stop It., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/opinion/libya-civil-war-.html.
46
Wehrey and Feltman, supra note 45.
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as efforts to reconcile main parties in the east and
west failed. In Libya’s south, Tebu, Tuareg, and Arab
armed groups continued to clash for control of territory and resources.47
As of May 2019, the Council on Foreign Relations noted there
were approximately 60,000 refugees and another nearly 200,000 internally displaced persons as a result of the Libyan civil war, which
has engrossed the country since the downfall of Gaddafi.48
As recently as May 2020, Libya remains chaotic and ungovernable.49 James Roscoe, in his speech to the U.N., noted concern over
Russia’s new involvement in the country. Specifically, the concerns
include, “the recent transfer of Russian aircraft from Syria to
Libya’s putschist Gen. Khalifa Haftar to aid him in his campaign
against the U.N.-recognized government.”50 All of this confirms
Libya remains destabilized, causing further issues for the Arab region as a whole. This also comes at a time with escalating human
rights concerns against Kurds in Syria from Turkish invasions and
Syria potentially becoming a Russian protectorate, all while Israeli
forces go after Iranian-backed Syrian forces.51 This becomes important as there may be a traceable impact from the U.S. and NATO

47

Libya,
Events
2018,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
(2018),
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/libya.
48
Civil War in Libya, supra note 44.
49
Mustafa Fetouri, Why is Libya so chaotic and ungovernable?, MIDDLE
EAST MONITOR (May 21, 2020), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200521why-is-libya-so-chaotic-and-ungovernable/.
50
US, UK concerned over growing evidence of Russian involvement in Libya,
DAILY SABAH (May 31, 2020), https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/us-uk-concerned-over-growing-evidence-of-russian-involvement-in-libya/news.
51
Khairallah Khairallah, The new rules of the game in Syria, THE ARAB
WEEKLY (Jan. 06, 2020), https://thearabweekly.com/new-rules-game-syria; Report: Russia building new military base in northeast Syria, AL-MONITOR (May
28, 2020), https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/russia-new-military-base-northeast-syria.html; Amberin Zaman, Turkey’s assault against Syrian
Kurds leaves trail of misery and spin, AL-MONITOR (May 29, 2020),
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/turkey-incursion-syria-refugees-burn-victims-accusations.html; Israeli aircraft reportedly pound military
outposts in Syria, AL JAZEERA (May 5, 2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/syria-israeli-jets-hit-military-outpostsaleppo-province-200505022122693.htmls
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Operations in Libya destabilizing the region and spilling over into
Syria.
III.

WORKABLE DEFINITIONS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The serious issues that continue after U.S. and NATO military
operations call into question the basis of humanitarian intervention
in modern practice, or at least those interventions under the guise of
that claim. Before exploring P4D as a standalone threshold criterion,
we must first visit upon workable definitions of customary international law and humanitarian intervention.
Defining Customary International Law: Durin’s Bane
To understand the doctrine of humanitarian intervention one
must first understand its relationship to customary international law.
Customary international law is one component of international law,
the other is treaties.52 The doctrine of humanitarian intervention remains within the realm of customary international law despite efforts to bring it within the purview of the U.N. Charter.53 Indeed, the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention was born out of custom and
remains solely in the domain of customary international law.54
One of the main issues with the current state of customary international law is that it is enveloped in “deep legal theory and ideology.”55 In turn, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is deeply
A.

52
See generally Alexei Paish, The Useful and Necessary Distinction Between
Customary International Law and Treaties, MCCARTHY TETRAULT (Oct. 11,
2016), https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/vestra-vox/useful-and-necessary-distinction-between-customary-international-law-and-treaties.
53
Sir Daniel Bethlehem KCMG QC, Stepping Back a Moment – The Legal
Basis in Favour of a Principle of Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL: TALK! (Sep.
12, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-infavour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention/.
54
See Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects, DANISH
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1999), https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/extra/humanitarian_intervention_1999.pdf.
55
INT’L LAW ASSOC., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE
FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000) [hereinafter
ILA],
2,

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

37

rooted in legal theory, because it is based on custom. 56 Consequently, defining customary international law and the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention is an exercise that can be likened to
Durin’s Bane,57 where jurists and academics end up digging too
deep into legal theory, eventually unraveling the concept they attempted to articulate in the first place.
There is no universally accepted, formal definition of customary
international law.58 “Customary . . . practice of states followed . . .
from a sense of legal obligation,” is the definition of customary international law codified in the treatise, Restatement of the Law
(Third) The Foreign Relations Law of the United States.59 The sixteen-year long committee project undertaken by the preeminent International Law Association (ILA) issued a comprehensive report
(ILA Report) on the formation of general customary international
law60 that defined general customary international law as:
[A] rule of customary international law is one which
is created and sustained by the constant and uniform
practice of States and other subjects of international
law in or impinging upon their international legal relations, in circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the future . . .
If a sufficiently extensive and representative number
of States participate in such a practice in a consistent
manner, the resulting rule is one of ‘general customary international law’ . . . Where a rule of general
https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/drwcasebook/Documents/Documents/ILA%20Report%20on%20Formation%20of%20Customary%20Internatio
nal%20Law.pdf.
56
Id.
57
J.R.R. Tolkien perhaps explains why some things should be left undisturbed: “they delved too greedily and too deep, and disturbed that from which
they fled, Durin’s Bane.” J.R.R. T OLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS 309 (HarperCollins Publishers 2014).
58
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customary international law exists, for any particular
State to be bound by that rule it is not necessary to
prove either that State’s consent to it or its belief in
the rule’s obligatory or (as the case may be) permissive character.61
B. Defining Humanitarian Intervention: Help, Rescue, Or Protect
Humanitarian intervention is a highly controversial concept
which has occasioned a deep split among legal publicists.62 Humanitarian intervention can be a legitimate and necessary remedy in certain well-defined instances, such as terrorist hostage seizure incidents.63 But because there is no universally accepted, formal definition of humanitarian intervention, defining humanitarian intervention is equally difficult. Fernando Tesón affirmatively states, “I define humanitarian intervention as proportionate help, including forcible help, provided by governments (individually or in alliances) to
individuals in another state who are victims of severe tyranny (denial of human rights by their own government) or anarchy (denial of
human rights by collapse of the social order).”64 Alan Kuperman
finds humanitarian intervention, “encompasses any international action that is primarily motivated by the humanitarian desire to protect
civilian targets of state violence.”65 In unpacking the meaning of humanitarian intervention, the Australian philosopher C.A.J. Coady
finds the term “is now used to distinguish interventions that are
aimed at rescuing foreign people from the harm that is being done,
or is about to be done, to them by the state authorities who are responsible for their protection.”66
These definitions of humanitarian intervention, though formulated differently, do contain major elements that bind them together.
61

Id. at 8.
Robert A. Friedlander, Confusing Victims and Victimizers: Nicaragua and
the Reinterpretation of International Law, 14 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 87, 90
(1985).
63
Id.
64
Fernando R. Tesón, Ending Tyranny in Iraq, 19 ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 1, 2 (2005).
65
Alan J. Kuperman, The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 49, 51-52 (2008).
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C.A.J. Coady, The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, 45
PEACEWORKS 1, 11-12 (2002).
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The terms rescuing, help, and protect intertwine these definitions
and lend a cohesiveness. These three terms are also altruistic notations. Coady goes so far as to note a better term of art for this type
of intervention would be altruistic intervention.67 The base term humanitarian is meant as a differentiating signifier between other
forms of interventions, such as those for conquest, or cases of selfdefense or retaliation.68 As such, through the use of the various definitions, a general sense of humanitarian intervention can be given
as means of intervention used under the premise to help, rescue, or
protect a population suffering, or about to suffer, gross human rights
violations in the sovereign territory of another nation.
A workable definition of humanitarian intervention allows for a
foundational understanding of its place in international law. But
with the focus on the notions of help, rescue, or protect coming to
the fore, this also placed an added emphasis on the need to look
closer at the human element of these types of intervention. Thus,
moving away from the theoretical and into the practical—that is, the
actual ground level where people are involved in these conflicts,
whether it be victim, military, rebel, refugee, or central government.
By incorporating additional fields of study into the topic, the authors
conclude that the overall practical understanding of the implementation and impact of humanitarian interventions could be markedly
improved.
IV.

STRENGTHENING P4D WITH NON-LAW BASED REASONING:
ECONOMICS, ETHICS & CHANGE MANAGEMENT
The fields of economics, ethics, and change management each
provide support for the elevation of P4D to that of a threshold criterion, as each field has theories that inform the definition and nature
of humanitarian intervention. A general failure by some jurists to
look beyond the field of international law when addressing the very
complex and human-focused concept of humanitarian intervention
led the authors to turn to theories developed in economics, ethics,

67

Id. at 12.
See id. at 11-12; see also Onder Bakircioglu, The Right to Self-Defence in
National and International Law: The Role of the Imminence Requirement, 19 IND.
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and change management to address the practical realities of humanitarian intervention.
A.

Moral Hazard Concept
Countries that engage in military interventions in the name of
humanitarianism should be aware of the moral hazard concept. The
moral hazard concept aptly demonstrates the logical examination
that P4D encourages before States engage in military intervention
for humanitarian reasons. The moral hazard concept raises the issue
of whether the act of intervention itself, especially in cases of frequent use, creates a destabilizing situation solely by the mere prospect of its potential use. Internal revolutionaries may take actions
to further destabilize a country or region while believing their calls
for help will be answered in time by the international community.
Paradoxically, assisting frequently causes death to civilians 69—the
very thing that giving assistance was meant to stop. The moral hazard concept begs the question: what are the destabilizing factors of
intervention? And that is its connection to P4D.
As Kuperman relays, “[i]n economics, moral hazard is the phenomenon in which the provision of protection against risk (often by
insurance) unintentionally promotes irresponsible or fraudulent
risk-taking, and thereby perversely increases the likelihood of the
undesired outcome.”70 Kuperman uses the moral hazard concept to
discuss the implications of excessive use of humanitarian intervention. His premise, in its simplest term, is that with the increased use
of humanitarian intervention, marginalized groups in a certain sovereign nation are more likely to act out in armed rebellion with the
hope that outside military aid will be forthcoming.71
Kuperman acknowledges, as his definition of humanitarian intervention indicates, that the intent is to protect vulnerable people
against state-perpetrated genocide or ethnic cleansing.72 However,
“by raising expectations of diplomatic and military intervention to
protect groups targeted by such retaliation, creates moral hazard that

69
70
71
72

Kuperman, supra note 65, at 49.
Id. at 50.
See generally id. at 51.
Id. at 50.
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unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and
increasing its likelihood of success.”73 As Kuperman explains,
In some cases, moral hazard promotes irresponsibility: for example, a group’s leaders will acquire arms
and secede from the state even though they know this
may trigger state retaliation that they cannot defend
against, because they expect the international community either to deter such retaliation or intervene on
their behalf in the event of violence. In other cases,
moral hazard promotes outright fraud: for example,
rebels will attack state officials deliberately intending to provoke retaliation against their own group’s
civilians, to attract international intervention that
they deem necessary to attain their political goals. In
practice, intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their goals, but usually it is too late or inadequate
to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the emerging norm causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur.74
One could argue that the moral hazard concept was tested in the
Arab Spring, and more fundamentally in Libya and Syria following
the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and the international responses
to them.75 Kuperman published his work on the moral hazard concept in 2008—two years before the Arab Spring and three years before Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya and the start of the Syrian
conflict.76 His thoughts about the moral hazard concept and its effect
73

Id. at 51.
Id.
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their story. A few weeks into the uprising, however, the rebel leaders clearly
viewed prospective NATO intervention as vital, in light of the government’s superior military resources.”).
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on military intervention seem to have been verified by events occurring in Libya post-publication.77
In Libya, the international intervention was well documented
and the intervention’s destabilizing after-effects well felt. In Syria,
the world was presented with an underequipped revolution meeting
first-hand with a well-equipped and nefarious government response,78 thus leading to one of the greatest humanitarian crises of
the new millennium. The international assistance for the revolutionaries has proven inadequate to avert retaliation from the Syrian government and the country has spent the better part of a decade killing
itself from within.
B.

Ethical Considerations
The inclusion of ethics facilitates a bigger picture discussion of
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in terms of the realities of
war and military intervention, above and beyond the nuances of the
doctrine. Bringing ethics into the discussion of humanitarian intervention allows for words such as paradox, paradigms, and morality
to gain stronger significance in the legal understanding of humanitarian intervention. Ethics reminds jurists of the paradox of using
violence to quell violence, and the never-ending cycle that it creates.
Calling a military intervention humanitarian does not make it any
less violent. Not coming to terms with that means we are unable to
effectuate the change we hope for: the end of tyranny and the end of
gross human rights violations. Violence is destabilizing because it
causes death and destruction, but the hope is that death and destruction will be minimal compared to the advances made. Coady notes
this specifically when discussing what gives the world or a region
the best chance at stability and peace.79 Therefore, before any military intervention, the potential intervenors must clearly understand
the potential for domestic or regional destabilization, which is
BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east26116868.
77
E-mail from Alan J. Kuperman, Ph.D. to Richard A.C. Alton, Esq. (Jan.
28, 2019) (affirming the idea that the moral hazard contributed to the perpetuation,
if not the initiation, of the Libya intervention).
78
See generally Lina Sinjab, Syria conflict: from peaceful protest to civil
war, BBC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east21797661.
79
See C.A.J. Coady, supra note 66, at 24.
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ethics’ connection to P4D, and that which moves it beyond Nanda’s
criteria.
Coady defines ethics as something that “should form a vital part
of the body of knowledge we have and continue to seek about the
most sensible and sustainable answers to the question ‘How should
we live?’”80 In bringing ethics to the table, Coady utilizes Just War
Theory.81 “The primary ethical machinery for considering whether
aggressive war can be humanitarian must at least begin with the ‘just
war tradition.’”82 As such, ethical considerations involve a much
older historical context, well beyond the time frames typically examined when assessing recent military actions taken in the name of
humanitarian intervention.83
As to our current undertaking in using ethics to better understand
humanitarian intervention, Coady continues, “humanitarian intervention has to overcome the presumptive case against aggressive
war and has to discharge the other requirements of just war theory.”84 Coady delivers this understanding by proffering moralistic
ideas of good and evil, “[t]his includes attention to the immediate
good likely to be achieved and evil averted by intervention set
against any violation of rights to self-determination involved, and
against the consequences for world stability and peace that may be
in prospect further down the road.”85 As a tool, Coady asserts,
“[e]thics is not only a matter of calculating consequences, but it does
include the calculating of consequences and the weighing of different goods and evils, and just war theory reflects this in its requirements, especially that of proportionality.”86
In searching for a root cause, Coady finds, “[i]n addition, the
attractions of decisive violence frequently tend to distract us from
80

Id. at 13.
Id. at 18.
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Id.
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the more fundamental, though less glamorous, task of reconsidering
and reconstructing our domestic and international politics so that our
world will be a somewhat less dangerous and exploitative place for
all its inhabitants.”87 Humanitarian intervention is undoubtedly, regardless of the negative or positive view of its necessity, painted in
altruistic violence. Coady’s work asks us to acknowledge that paradox and prepare ourselves for its consequence.88 However, as noted
in Coady’s comment above, the world may be better suited in rooting out the base cause of the need for intervention as opposed to
adding further violence regardless if that violence is called humanitarian.
Coady posits “Can an ‘aggressive’ war be humanitarian?”89 As
Coady notes, jurists seeking to differentiate war and humanitarian
intervention are not seeing the forest for the trees, and “may be influenced by the feeling, shared by many enthusiasts for humanitarian intervention, that it is really a form of policing rather than war.”90
While Coady acknowledges that may be the case in some instances,
the reality is “interventions require warriors rather than police,
though police may be useful, if hard to come by, after an intervention.”91 However, Coady finds that this realization of the paradox of
humanitarian intervention is in part recognized in international law:
So the air of paradox is connected with the morally
problematic nature of resort to war, and this explains,
to a large degree, the strong bias in international law
and the UN Charter against military intervention,
which must be viewed in light of the revulsion
against the horrors associated with the great aggressive wars of the twentieth century.92
C.

Transition Model
Examining humanitarian intervention in the light of change
management and the transition model helps decipher events that
have occurred in the wake of such interventions. The transition
87
88
89
90
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92
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model allows for a micro examination of what humans need to cope
with change and stresses the importance that any transition be natural.93 Individuals need time to work through loss or change; they
need a neutral zone to gain insight and build their new beginning.
Having their new beginning thrust upon them whilst amid an ending
has a destabilizing result upon the person. The same is true for a
country going through a transition, having their new beginning
forced upon them can have a deteriorating effect as can be seen playing out in Libya. Therein lies the transition model’s connection to
P4D.
The transition model is a tool used by professionals in change
management.94 Change management is a professional discipline
geared towards guiding organizations and the individuals that make
up those organizations through dealing with how to prepare and successfully adopt change.95 The transition model was developed by
change consultant William Bridges.96 Transition, according to
Bridges, comes in three stages: (1) an ending, loss, or a letting go,
(2) a neutral zone, and (3) a new beginning.97
In discussing change generally, Bridges raises questions that
speak also to countries undergoing regime change, regardless if that
previous regime was villainous. “Why is letting go so difficult? This
is a puzzling question, especially if we have been looking forward
to change. It is frightening to discover that some part of us is still
holding on to what we used to be, for it makes us wonder whether
the change was a bad idea.”98 Bridges acknowledges, “that letting
go is at best an ambiguous experience.”99 Transition, in this sense,
is not solely moving from one point to the other; it is an experience
93
Bridges’ Transition Model, WILLIAM BRIDGES ASSOC. TRANSITION
MGMT. LEADERS, https://wmbridges.com/about/what-is-transition/ (last visited
Sept. 7, 2020).
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95
What is Change Management?, PROSCI INC., https://www.prosci.com/resources/articles/what-is-change-management (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
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TOOLS,
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absorbed into the person who is transitioning. Both the loss and the
transition leave vestiges of themselves in the individual. Individuals,
Bridges finds, naturally desire a quick transition.100 Yet, there lies
importance in a natural transition as opposed to a forced, rapid move
from an ending to a new beginning.
The neutral zone in the transition model represents that time
spent between the ending and the new beginning.101 Bridges refutes
the idea that it should be likened to the act of crossing a street. 102
The realization that the neutral zone serves a purpose rather than an
obstacle, a tool rather than a nuisance, is at the core of the transition
model.103
Individuals, while desirous of change, usually believe the neutral zone is more of a nuisance and an obstacle.104 Bridges notes,
“[p]eople often ask whether there isn’t some way to speed up transition, to get it over sooner; when they do, they are usually thinking
of the time in the neutral zone when very little seems to be happening.”105 However, the neutral zone affords individuals the ability to
fully divest from the past, and “as does any unfolding natural process, the neutral zone takes its own sweet time.”106 More concerning, arbitrary acts of speeding up the neutral zone process can have
the reverse effect. “Far from bringing you out the neutral zone
sooner, such tactics usually set you back and force you to start over
again.”107 As a word of warning, Bridges concludes, “[f]rustrating
though it is, the best advice is to opt for the turtle and forget the
hare.”108
The neutral zone allows for insight and germination of new
ideas.109 It is a necessary element in change and will undoubtedly
occur after any loss or ending; the speed at which it occurs may also
be uncontrollable. Bridges is speaking on an individual level of how
people transition from one stage to the next. This may appear to be
100
101
102
103
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a microelement in the discussion of a macro topic such as humanitarian intervention, but if it does, then the realization that when dealing with humanitarian intervention we are dealing with individual
human beings has been lost. That is a key connection between the
transition model and humanitarian intervention, and in turn, P4D,
that we are dealing with people and the changes wrought upon them,
regardless if that change was demanded.
The transition model is another tool outside of the legal realm
that may be used to consider the importance of P4D in humanitarian
intervention. Change movement consultant, Sean E. Reynolds (Veteran U.S. Navy), acknowledged the similarities about destabilizing
organizational change and the resulting destabilization often seen
after the abrupt removal of authority structures on the international
stage as noted in the authors’ earlier works.110 As Reynolds notes,
concerning the relationship between change management on an individual level and to that of an international level:
Understanding that groups and organizations behave
like organisms we can understand that cultures behave and interact with one another like organisms irrespective of borders. In the context of International
Relations, change management is the deliberate methodical management of controlling specific outcomes through the transitions one or more culture, or
nation, faces as a result of intervention.111
Libya and Kosovo again serve as good examples of how
Bridges’s warning about taking a step back can play out if a transition is forced to speed up. During the period that Libya was in the
midst of a revolution—the Arab Spring—U.S. and NATO operations in the region sped the transition along by assisting the revolution under the umbrella of humanitarian intervention.112 The death
of Gaddafi brought an end to the U.S. and NATO operations.113 As
110
E-mail from Sean E. Reynolds, LSSMBB, MBA, CPM, to Richard A.C.
Alton, Esq. (Apr. 11, 2019) (on file with author).
111
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Alton, Esq. (June 3, 2019) (on file with author).
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opposed to ushering in a jubilant time of renewal and a stronger
Libya, the country fell into the grips of a civil war that has lasted for
more than half a decade.114 Likewise, NATO operations in Kosovo
effectively ended any possibility of any joint proceedings between
Kosovo and Serbia,115 leaving Kosovo’s declaration of independence the only option, and thus dashing any hope for natural healing
between the two nations. These findings evince that while forced
intervention may speed along a transition the effects can be detrimental.
Additionally, Bridges’s comment on its best to let the neutral
zone play out in its time116 rings the same of Coady’s conclusion
that while less glamorous, rooting out the fundamental causes that
lead to humanitarian intervention may serve the best in the long
term, if not the short term.117 Taken in connection with the warnings
supplied by Kuperman, we begin to build a comprehensive framework for the need of pushing P4D to the fore. Rapidly forcing
change, even welcome change, during a transitional time such as a
revolution can have a destabilizing turn on a population. That understanding is key to P4D.
V.
PRE-EXISTING THRESHOLDS: R2P & RWP
P4D is not the only standalone threshold criterion or principle
when it comes to humanitarian intervention. R2P and RWP are two
other well-recognized principles.118 By comparing and contrasting
P4D to treaty-based criteria R2P and RWP, we strengthen the case
that P4D should be a standalone criterion in the framework of humanitarian intervention.
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2020), https://time.com/5779348/war-libya-global-conflict/.
115
Ved P. Nanda, NATO’s Armed Intervention in Kosovo and International
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A.

The Creation And Degradation Of R2P
In the wake of Kosovo, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) presented a report titled The
Responsibility to Protect.119 The R2P doctrine consists of two main
criteria.120 First, “State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the
primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the
state itself.”121 Second, “Where a population is suffering serious
harm . . . and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international
responsibility to protect.”122
These principles were later adopted by the U.N. and manifested
themselves as follows:
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect
its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will
act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help
States to exercise this responsibility and support the
United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
The international community, through the United
Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means,
in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter,
119
INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1
(2001),
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.
120 Id.
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including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations.123
However, even with the advent of R2P, the authors found the
notion that as soon as crimes against humanity are committed that
the international community should step in to be simplistic and
vague.124 Also, there still exists the possibility for action outside of
the purview of U.N. statutes.125 The possibility for action outside of
the U.N. statutes is also bounded in the reality of inaction on the part
of the U.N. Security Council, because of either lack of political will
or outright lack of cooperation.126 R2P stood as the guiding light for
humanitarian intervention until it was questioned and criticized.
B.

No One Heeds The Call For Reform: RWP
RWP was born in late 2011, during U.N. Security Council deliberations concerning the advancing Syrian civil war and in the
larger discussion of R2P and the U.N. Security Council’s role. 127 It
was during this time that the U.N. Permanent Representative of Brazil, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, presented to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral a concept note, entitled Responsibility while protecting: Elements for the development and promotion of a concept.128 The concept note addressed “the ‘painful consequences’ of past interventions—aggravation of existing conflicts, increased incidence both of
terrorism and vulnerability of civilian populations, and new cycles
of violence—and a ‘growing perception’ that R2P might be misused
for
purposes
such
as
regime
change.”129
123
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RWP was not seen as a means of supplanting R2P with a
new theorem, but as a means of checking R2P’s original intent with
proper mechanisms and assurances.130 “The Brazilian proposal suggested the establishment of what could be described as a ‘code of
conduct’ for the practical operationalization of R2P, particularly in
its coercive dimensions.”131 As true to its name, RWP sought to put
the burden of some of the responsibility of the results of intervention
on the international intervenors, not solely on the internal actors.
Force is to be used, per RWP, only under the guidance of the U.N.
Security Council or in exceptional circumstances approved by the
U.N. General Assembly.132 Force must be proportionate, not exceed
its U.N. mandate, nor cause more harm than it sought to prevent.133
Among the legacy of RWP is that “[i]t attracted a wider range of
participants to the discussion by emphasizing not only the moral issues associated with enforcing R2P, but also other problems with
the collective security system, such as authority and accountability.”134
The word legacy is important, as RWP never fully materialized
into specific proposals.135 It did leave its mark on discussions of
R2P.136 However, its connectedness to R2P and the U.N. Security
Council led to its inability to function outside of it. As Nanda appropriately concluded, “the reality that without political will and cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council no
action is possible at the United Nations.”137 With an inability to

the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the
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cooperate among the permanent members, R2P has lost some appeal, regardless of whatever RWP sought to add.
VI.
P4D AS A STANDALONE THRESHOLD CRITERION
With sabers rattling over potential military intervention in Latin
America, the authors believe it is time to present P4D as a standalone
threshold criterion. The vacuum left by R2P needs to be filled by a
forward-thinking criterion like P4D. Because most recent military
actions have had their focus on removing central governments and
their authority structures, the international community requires a criterion that directly acknowledges the practical over the theoretical.
So why push P4D beyond Nanda’s criteria and beyond R2P and
RWP? As for P4D’s primary position before Nanda’s criteria and
those like it, the issue was presented that if all the criteria except
P4D were met then a humanitarian intervention might be justified.138
This, however, would prove disastrous for entire regions, unleashing
the potential to throw not just one country, but dozens to the brink
of civil war and chaos. The concern is that international actors would
feel legally justified because they had satisfied all other criteria. As
such, P4D was pushed to the foreground to avoid this potential issue.
As for preceding R2P and RWP, P4D recognizes the ability of humanitarian interventions outside of the inflexible U.N.139 and P4D
acknowledges the deterioration of R2P as the marquee threshold of
humanitarian intervention.140
The very nature of, and the calculations required by, P4D demand that it be the first consideration. The elevation of P4D to that
of a threshold criterion is necessary and appropriate because it
frames the most likely outcome of military action by States taken to
protect populations from gross human rights abuses. The calculations required by P4D—those used to examine whether global or
regional destabilization might occur from failure to exhaust all nonmilitary actions and the potential of removing central governments
and other authority structures—need to be made before international
actors begin to look at necessity, proportionality, purpose, nature of
the actors, and maximization of the best outcomes of any single
138
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intervention. P4D requires States to examine the potential for destabilizing regions and countries before discussing whether a certain
crisis fulfills any of the other criteria for justifying military intervention.
Procedurally, P4D was developed with two central elements: (1)
the international community must be satisfied that it has exhausted
all plausible nonmilitary actions before taking collective military action, and (2) the international community must take into account the
quantifiable result of removing the central government before taking
collective military action.141 P4D now requires international actors
to examine the potential for destabilizing regions and countries before engaging in a discussion of whether or not the facts satisfy any
other criteria for involvement. Before taking collective military action in the name of humanitarian intervention, the international community should determine the most likely outcome of abruptly removing central governments.142 This is because of the reality that
“[i]n the absence of a central government, practical procedural safeguards cannot be put in place to protect civilians from internal
threats.”143 As a standalone threshold, P4D must be applied to current suggested humanitarian interventions.
VII.

P4D APPLIED TO CURRENT POTENTIAL HUMANITARIAN
CRISES
“[T]he only positive way forward for Venezuela is through a negotiated, democratic and peaceful solution stemming from free and
fair presidential elections in accordance with international
norms.”144 These are the words taken from a speech by Ambassador
James Roscoe, U.K. Acting Deputy Permanent Representative to the
U.N., at the Security Council briefing on Venezuela, and were in
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response to a failed coup called Operation Gideon,145 which has
come to be described as “the dumbest damn coup plot” in Latin
American History.146 This particular coup does not appear to be in
response to the federal indictments against Nicolás Maduro and
other Venezuelans, which came with an award of $55 million U.S.
Dollars; but the coup no doubt brought it to the forefront.147 What if
the coup had succeeded, or what if it comes to pass that there is sufficient pressure to cause a military intervention in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, or Syria? We may only need to look to Libya for answers.
A similar fate may be waiting for Latin America if any military
action in Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Cuba occurs or another coup succeeds. In discussing the current state of affairs in October 2019, the
Washington Post noted, “[t]he crises, while different from country
to country, have some common threads. The economy in much of
Latin America has slowed. Democratic institutions remain weak.
The public is far less tolerant of corruption and poor services. And
polarization is rising.”148 As the Post finds, “[a]ll of this makes for
flammable situations.”149 This was all before a global lockdown to
stop the spread of COVID-19, so it is conceivable that the situation
has turned from bad to worse.
Libya presented a sufficient model to apply P4D.150 In 2014, the
authors determined that the U.S. and NATO Libyan operations
failed to satisfy P4D’s two elements, because the goal was to oust
Gaddafi and the international community failed to consider a proper
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transition for Libya before removing him.151 In doing so an entire
region was destabilized; a similar fate awaits Latin Americans if we
are foolish enough to go down the same path twice.
The potential for a similar Arab Spring scenario playing out in
Venezuela and Latin America is compelling. As of this writing, the
Venezuela opposition has already attempted an unsuccessful
coup.152 The opposition has intimated at the possibility of asking for
foreign intervention, specifically from the U.S.153 How the repercussions of this would be felt if international actors were to answer this
call is intriguing, especially in similarly situated countries like Nicaragua. If domestic actors believe their calls for international help
will be answered, it may only serve to galvanize revolutions which
otherwise would have been internal struggles.
A humanitarian intervention involves an act of violence as much
as any other act of violence, regardless of its name. The authors,
living in a state (Florida) that has a large number of people with
family and friends who are being harmed, tortured, or have been
killed in countries such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, cannot
ignore that there is the unfortunate balancing act about stopping
these harms or causing an unfettered amount of more death. It is the
perceived, or even hopeful, benefits of avoiding sitting on the sideline while watching a humanitarian crisis unfold that elevates it to a
moral high ground. But, in doing so we cannot ignore the contradiction of stopping violence with violence and the repercussions that
follow from it.
It is not hard to see the potential for destabilization spreading to
countries such as Ecuador, Peru, Honduras, and Haiti, which were
all in the beginning stages of turmoil before the COVID-19 pandemic.154 No situation is the same, but when stressors already exist
in a region, the full-blown immediate destruction of the central government and other authority structures in one country as a result of
military intervention may spill over into another, causing an entire
region to slip into turmoil, which may, in turn, lead to additional
cases of gross human rights abuses.
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If the authors were to apply P4D’s central elements—(1) the international community must be satisfied that it has exhausted all
plausible nonmilitary actions, and (2) the international community
must take into account the quantifiable result of removing the central
government and other authority structures before taking collective
military action—to the current situation, the conclusion would be
clear. While there is no doubt the legitimacy of human rights violations occurring in countries such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and
Cuba, P4D would be a stopgap measure to any full-blown intervention. As James Roscoe notes,155 the only plausible way forward is
through peaceful means that are still ongoing in countries such as
Venezuela.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The time is now for P4D to assume the mantel left by the degradation of past criteria such as R2P and RWP. P4D has moved beyond multifaceted and multi-layered criteria such as Nanda’s, because the authors recognize the true goal of most current forms of
intervention heralded as humanitarian intervention. Human rights
violations are occurring across the globe, but intervention is meant
to stop violence, not to add to it.
Altruistic humanitarian intervention is still needed in today’s
world, but questions of its lack of proper utilization can be raised in
such overlooked past crises, such as Rwanda, or current ones, such
as Myanmar. In practice, most forms of current humanitarian intervention are or have become moves for regime change. The threat of
its use in Latin America is beyond concerning. Lives have been destroyed under such interventions, and worse, done so without appropriate forethought. Practically, we as a society must be cognizant
that today’s revolutions are televised and tweeted about; thus, jurists
would be hard-pressed to ignore the reliance on international assistance by victimized groups in sovereign nations to end their plights.
Extra caution must be used to prevent an entire continent from being
pushed to the brink of war.
P4D is not meant to diminish those subjected to tyrannical regimes. Rather, it is meant as a call to responsible parties: before we
unleash the dragons of war upon a population, we need to think
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about what that will mean not just tomorrow, but the next day and a
thousand days after that. These are dark times; there is no denying
that. But we can no longer dabble in war in the name of humanitarian intervention. And if there is no appetite in the international community to fully subjugate a nation that has committed gross human
rights violations to ensure the least amount of destabilization, our
current form of humanitarian intervention seems to only cause further harm.

